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Crowell - Philosophy in Review XXXV (April 2015), no. 2 
 
Sacha Golob. Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom, and Normativity. Cambridge University 
Press 2014. 282 pp. $95.00 USD (Hardcover ISBN 9781107031708).  
Sacha Golob’s carefully argued, clearly written, and philosophically engaging book is a 
welcome addition to the growing literature that brings Heidegger’s sprawling and apparently 
idiosyncratic thought into dialogue with philosophical approaches that are temperamentally 
very different from it–above all, analytic philosophy. As this book amply demonstrates, the 
rewards are many, both for understanding Heidegger and for fostering insight into 
philosophical issues. Here the issue is intentionality, the ‘property, typically attributed to 
mental states, whereby those states are directed toward or about something’ (6). Golob is 
well-versed in the analytic literature on intentionality and is careful to define his terms in 
ways that do not prejudge the many contested matters found there, but a direct confrontation 
with analytic philosophy is not his primary goal. That goal is, rather, to offer an alternative to 
what he calls the ‘dominant approach’ (5) to Heidegger’s account of intentionality. In doing 
so he carves out for Heidegger a position in dialectical space that might seem paradoxical: the 
‘explanatorily primary’ form of intentionality is non-propositional but nevertheless 
conceptual.  
 The dominant approach is represented by a set of authors whose work has been 
informed by Hubert Dreyfus’s influential reading of Heidegger. Thus the book engages in 
detail with arguments advanced by Taylor Carman, Mark Wrathall, William Blattner, Mark 
Okrent, Cristina Lafont, and Dreyfus himself, among others. The dominant approach is 
‘dominant’ not because it is shared by most Heidegger scholars, but because it is practically 
the only one to treat Heidegger as an interlocutor in contemporary philosophical debates 
about intentionality, language, truth, and meaning. Golob’s treatment of it, then–certainly the 
most comprehensive and critical one to date–should be required reading for anyone interested 
in those issues. Here I can only sketch that treatment, but the real value of the book lies in its 
detailed analyses.  
§Chapter One lays out the terms, beginning with two claims drawn from Heidegger: first, that 
‘assertion’ reduces entities to presence-at-hand; and second, that assertion derives from a 
more primordial engagement with things. Golob argues that Heidegger’s notion of assertion 
is not limited to a certain speech act but includes all ‘propositional intentionality’, i.e., all 
propositional attitudes (15). The dominant approach holds that propositional intentionality 
derives from an intentionality that is not only non-propositional, but also (supposedly for that 
reason) non-conceptual. Golob’s strategy in this chapter is to undermine the claim that there 
is a necessary connection between propositional intentionality and the ontology of the 
present-at-hand, thereby undermining the dominant approach’s way of establishing that 
‘propositional intentionality is explanatorily derivative on some irreducibly non-propositional 
mode of intentionality’ (18). In Chapter Two, Golob follows with his own view of the 
relation between assertion and the present-at-hand in Being and Time, on the basis of which, 
in Chapter Three, he offers a novel account of Heidegger’s claim that propositional 
intentionality is derivative. Identifying problems with this view as well, Golob devotes two 
final chapters to exploring (what he takes to be) an alternative account drawn from 
Heidegger’s post-Being and Time reflections on the connection between freedom and 
normativity.  
 According to Golob’s Heidegger, ‘conceptual’ content must satisfy four conditions: it 
must be universal; it must support inferential relations; it must not be something that is too 
‘fine grained’ to be expressed in propositions; and it must be unavailable to non-human 
animals (10). Content  
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exhibiting these features is conceptual even if, as with perception, it is not exhausted by them. 
Golob then identifies three ‘logically independent’ meanings of ‘presence-at-hand’ in 
Heidegger’s text and defines the thesis to be denied as a disjunction of these senses. In none 
of them is there a necessary connection between propositional intentionality and the present-
at-hand, though there is a connection if we add a condition that Golob discusses in Chapter 
Two.  
 What is the basic objection to the dominant approach? Roughly, it explains the 
connection between propositional intentionality and the present-at-hand by arguing that the 
former derives from an intentionality which resides in embodied skills and abilities that elude 
capture in the conceptual form of assertions. But (among other things) the argument is 
exegetically suspect because it attributes to Heidegger a theory of ‘sensorimotor’ 
intentionality drawn from Merleau-Ponty, whereas ‘Heidegger shows little or no interest in 
developing the apparatus necessary to defend that kind of theory’ (45). Perhaps he should 
have, but the dominant approach should not be accepted as Heidegger’s until it is shown that 
no exegetically more satisfying account of the derivative character of propositional 
intentionality is possible.  
 In Chapter Two, Golob provides his own account of how propositional intentionality 
reduces being to presence-at-hand. Such a reduction obtains only if the disjunction earlier 
introduced is conjoined with a certain philosophical analysis of assertion, which Heidegger 
calls ‘logic’. By focusing exclusively on predication in abstraction from the assertion’s 
existential context, logic ‘dims down’ the full content of propositional intentionality (50-2) 
and yields an ontology of the present-at-hand. Propositions themselves are not the culprit–
after all, Heidegger’s text is full of them (64)–and there is scant evidence that Heidegger 
embraces an explanatorily basic level of intentionality that eludes propositional formulation. 
But then how do we explain Heidegger’s claim that propositional intentionality is derivative 
of a more primordial non-propositional form of intentionality?  
 Taking his cue from Heidegger’s call to ‘liberate grammar from logic’ (68), Golob 
addresses this question in Chapter Three, the most ambitious and complicated in the book. He 
proposes that the two levels of intentionality do not differ in regard to concept-involvement, 
as the dominant approach has it; rather, they differ in ‘grammar’: there are two ‘vehicles’ for 
conceptual content, the propositional and the ‘pre-propositional’ (68). The grammar of 
propositional content involves the ‘is’ (a is b); the grammar of conceptual but pre-
propositional content involves the ‘as’ (a as b). Propositional content is derivative because, as 
Heidegger puts it in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (1929/30): ‘The proposition 
“a is b” would not be possible with respect to what it means, and the way in which it means 
what it does, if it could not emerge from an underlying experience of “a as b” (72). The 
challenge for Golob, then, is to show why the ‘a as b’ is neither non-conceptual nor just an 
inchoate form of propositional content.  
 His argument is governed by two principles, ‘Context’ and ‘Apriori’. Context says 
that what is explanatorily basic in Heidegger’s account of intentionality is locating entities 
(the ‘a-variable’) within a relational/teleological context or ‘world’. And Apriori says that in 
order to locate entities in such a context I must have prior familiarity with it. According to 
Golob, Heidegger establishes Apriori through what Quassim Cassam calls a ‘self-directed 
transcendental argument’: given that I am capable of a certain kind of experience–in this 
case, the ability to locate entities in a context–the argument provides a ‘non-empirical 
analysis’ (hence Apriori) of the ‘intentional capacities I must possess in order to intend 
objects in this way’ (86-7). Further, on pain of infinite regress, Apriori entails the ontological 
difference: the intentional capacity I must possess is an ‘understanding of being’, where being 
is not itself an entity (88).  
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 In turning to the a-variable, these two principles help explain Heidegger’s stance 
toward representationalism. Heidegger clearly rejects ‘mediational’ representationalism, the 
view that the a-variable is some sort of mental entity that determines reference to an entity in 
the world (91-6). Heidegger’s target here is ‘Husserl’–that is, Husserl’s doctrine of the noema 
as interpreted by Dagfinn Føllesdal (and embraced by the dominant approach), which holds 
the noema to be a Fregean Sinn. In contrast, Golob argues that Heidegger’s account of the a-
variable is ‘Russellian’–that is, the a-variable is the entity itself. As he shows in a later 
chapter, this is compatible with a ‘minimal’ representationalism in which our experience of 
the entity in the a-as-b structure is not ‘brute’ but has ‘accuracy conditions’ (183).  
Golob’s Russellian interpretation of the explanatorily basic form of intentionality highlights 
Heidegger’s proximity to an alternative interpretation of Husserl, according to which the 
distinction between noema and object is not an ontological but a methodological one. On that 
reading, the noema ‘comes very close to Heidegger’s conception of “phenomena”’: the a-
variable as manifest within a context (96-7). On the Russellian interpretation, further, 
intentionality turns out to be relational, and Golob devotes some acute paragraphs to showing 
how Heidegger’s ‘externalism’ might address standard problems associated with the 
relational view, such as objectless presentations, illusions, and hallucinations (100-1).  
It is Golob’s discussion of the b-variable that forms the most original part of the book, 
however, and it exposes a tension that undermines the schema of Being and Time. Golob 
argues that Heidegger came to adopt a new approach to intentionality in the years 
immediately following its publication, but paradoxically his account of the b-variable, or 
‘context’, in Being and Time itself exploits the notion of ‘prototype’ (Vorbild) not found 
before the texts from 1928/29.  
 Golob associates the context–what I am already familiar with whenever I am 
intentionally directed toward an entity, my Vorgriff–with Heidegger’s notion of discourse 
(Rede, logos), but he rejects Cristina Lafont’s contention that context is identical to language. 
At the same time, he rejects the dominant approach’s claim that it is a non-conceptual 
framework of skills, practices, and gestures. Context, on Golob’s view, is both non-linguistic 
and conceptual, a ‘new vehicle for conceptuality’ (103). Heidegger has no name for this new 
vehicle in Being and Time, however, so Golob imports the Platonistic term ‘Vorbild’ from 
Vom Wesen des Grundes (1929) to unpack an implicit ‘prototype theory’ of concepts in Being 
and Time. A prototype is an exemplar that adumbrates a context or world (129). When I 
encounter the blackboard as badly positioned, for instance, it is because I am oriented by a 
prototype that adumbrates what I am trying to be (a teacher), which ‘forms’ (bildet) the 
normative order of the classroom-context in which blackboards can show up in appropriate or 
inappropriate ways. Such prototypes satisfy the four criteria for conceptual content 
introduced earlier (148-51), but being oriented by a prototype does not have a propositional 
structure.  
 In Being and Time Heidegger is especially concerned with the prototype for 
understanding beings as beings–and Golob devotes some careful pages to showing how 
Heidegger’s discussion of Kant’s schematism in the Kantbuch suggests that the prototype 
theory already governs Being and Time’s pursuit of time as the ultimate context for 
understanding being. However, the prototype theory involves a certain tension between 
Kantian and Platonic motives in Heidegger’s thinking, one that contributes to the failure of 
Being and Time.  
On the one hand, the prototype theory represents Heidegger’s attempt to free Platonism from 
the logical prejudice of the ‘theory of ideas’ (124); on the other, Heidegger’s ‘insertion of a 
prototype account of intentionality into the Critical framework’ (114), through his 
identification of time as the horizon for an understanding of being, ends in failure. In 
Chapters Five and Six, then, Golob argues that after Being and Time Heidegger’s 
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dissatisfaction with the Kantian architectonic led him to freedom as the explanatorily basic 
form of intentionality. Though these explorations, too, are carried out as a dialogue between 
Kant and Plato, it is the Platonic motif (I would argue) that contains the productive kernel of 
the prototype approach. I would go further: the ‘failure’ of Being and Time does not stem 
from the prototype theory itself but from the unmotivated idea that there must be one 
‘ultimate’ prototype, one meaning of being.  
 Before getting to that, however, Chapter Four applies the prototype theory to 
‘metaphysical’ questions (155) that have exercised readers of Being and Time for decades. 
John Searle, for example, dismisses Heideggerian phenomenology because it treats the ready-
to-hand as basic when it is obviously grounded in nature. In answer, Golob distinguishes 
between a narrow sense of the ready-to-hand, confined to tools, and a broad sense that covers 
all entities, including natural things, that have attained ‘world-entry’ and so can be intended 
(158). While the former are constituted by ‘mind-dependent’ properties (and so cannot exist 
without Dasein), the latter include entities whose properties are ‘prima facie mind-
independent’ (167). When Heidegger says that reality depends on Dasein, ‘reality’ is the 
prototype according to which we can intend real things as real. But this does not turn their 
mind-independent properties into mind-dependent ones; hence on Golob’s definition of 
‘idealism’, Heidegger is not an idealist (174).  
Nevertheless, Heidegger refuses the naturalistic ontological approach recommended by 
Searle: start with an account of mind-independent nature and arrive at the ‘narrow’ ready-to-
hand by adding certain teleological and social capacities. Why this refusal? Golob argues that 
Heidegger has no adequate answer to this question; rather, the refusal stems from his general 
project of providing ‘a non-naturalistic, non-reductive account of the nature of Dasein’s 
intentionality’, a project committed to the idea that normativity cannot be naturalized (161). 
At bottom, Golob argues, Being and Time has ‘no real story about, or interest in, the question 
of how Dasein relates to the present-at-hand insofar as the latter is considered outside the 
scope of intentionality’, and this deficiency (if it is one, I would add), is made good ‘in name 
only when Heidegger later appeals to ‘metontology’’ (162). On Searle’s definition of 
idealism as any theory that makes irreducibly de re reference to entities impossible, then, 
Heidegger’s realism may well count as idealism (176).  
 Regarding truth, Golob takes up Tugendhat’s influential claim that Heidegger’s 
explanatorily basic form of intentionality is non-normative, hence not a mode of truth at all. 
Golob denies that Russellian ‘acquaintance’ can be understood as some direct intuition 
(noein) of an entity prior to the a-as-b structure. Further, while acquaintance does not have a 
propositional structure, it is normatively assessable (hence relevantly truth-like) because it 
involves non-binary ‘accuracy conditions’ (183). The explanatorily basic level thus avoids 
Tugendhat’s criticism and can be used to address Cristina Lafont’s charge that Heidegger’s 
theory makes all empirical revision and learning impossible (185).  
 In the book’s final two chapters, then, normativity takes center stage. On Golob’s 
view, Heidegger turns to freedom–‘the capacity to recognize and commit oneself to norms’ 
(195)–to overcome the impasse of his account of temporality in Being and Time and Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology. Hence freedom–central to what Heidegger calls Dasein’s 
‘transcendence’–is the explanatorily basic form of intentionality that accounts for the 
irreducibly normative aspect of the a-as-b structure.  
Chapter Five develops this point by interpreting transcendence as Dasein’s ability to act ‘for 
the sake of’ something that it is trying to be. To act for the sake of being a teacher, for 
instance, is to commit oneself to the norms that govern success or failure in teaching. Doing 
so does not require that such norms be formulated as rules; and indeed on the prototype 
theory the Vorbild of teaching will not be a thematic object but something ‘understood’, a 
way of being that makes me beholden to entities in certain specific ways. Golob pursues this 
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issue through a comparison with ‘Kant’s “practical” account of freedom’ which, like 
Heidegger’s, ‘turns on a distinctive relation between selfhood, normativity, and the first-
person perspective’ (198). For Heidegger, as for Kant, ‘my being and behavior is mine 
because it is at issue for me’, that is, because its success or failure is normatively at stake 
(200). Such a conception of selfhood–in which the capacity to ‘take on, respond to and assess 
normative commitments’ is basic (202)–is conceptually (though perhaps not metaphysically) 
incompatible with my being a locus of external causal forces. I act in light of norms and not 
merely in accord with them. As Golob points out in his response to various Kantian and 
Hegelian objections to Heidegger’s concept of freedom, Heidegger is trying to address what 
Robert Pippin calls ‘the difficult to describe [...] character of the conceptual activity at work’ 
in the explanatorily basic form of intentionality (205).  
 Despite this Kantian analogue, Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s transcendence cannot 
appeal to any pre-given nature (e.g., ‘rational being’) as the normative prototype for such 
selfhood. In Chapter Six, Golob will suggest that ‘authenticity’ plays something like this role, 
but here it seems to me there is a missed opportunity. Heidegger himself identifies what 
replaces Kant’s ‘form of law’, namely, the Platonic agathon as epekeina tes ousias. Though 
Golob does not investigate this connection, it forms the heart of prototype theory: the 
ultimate context (measure, norm) for my being a self is not some particular exemplary ‘for 
the sake of’ or practical identity, nor is it some specific concept, like ‘time’; rather, it is the 
normative distinction between better and worse. To be a self is to act in light of ‘what is 
best’.  
 Golob’s account of authenticity, which includes consideration of the ‘factic’ character 
of the ‘normative terrain within which Dasein operates’ (213)–its ‘finitude’ and its 
dependence on das Man–turns on an interpretation of the breakdown of all Dasein’s 
particular ‘for the sake ofs’ or normative commitments. In Angst, death, and conscience 
Dasein experiences the ‘true facts about itself’, above all, a ‘set of limitations’ on its 
responsibility: that ‘nothing will ever provide the foundational ground’, or ultimate normative 
justification for what it does, ‘which was promised by theories such as the categorical 
imperative’ (235-6). On his reading, Angst teaches that there are ‘no norms, no possibilities, 
which are binding on Dasein simply in virtue of its being Dasein’ (230). And death, in turn, 
as Dasein’s ‘ownmost possibility’, shows that to be a self is to ‘confront’ the ‘absence of such 
a norm’ (233). Finally, conscience calls me to the kind of responsibility possible in such a 
situation: not to be responsible for the norms according to which I act (which derive from the 
social whole, das Man), but rather for their normative force. To be authentic, or ‘resolute’, is 
to act with a ‘transparent’ understanding of this existential relation to the space of reasons 
(218).  
 Here Golob poses two questions: Why should we accept Heidegger’s account of the 
self and its characterization of the normative ground of intentionality? And why should we 
care about authenticity? Thanks to the ‘scope of [Heidegger’s] ambition’, answering the first 
question is hard; it would, for instance, require us to ‘rule out alternatives’, such as normative 
realism, which Heidegger ‘barely considers’ (237). Golob answers the second question by 
appeal to what he calls Heidegger’s ‘methodological perfectionism’ (240). This yields, first, a 
hypothetical reason to care about authenticity: if Dasein ‘fully realizes its own essence’ in 
authenticity, and if such realization is ‘a necessary condition on good philosophy’, then 
insofar as I am engaged in the project of philosophy I will have a reason to care about 
authenticity (240). Because Heidegger holds that philosophy requires a special sort of first-
person commitment that ‘guarantees that we are “coining the appropriate existential 
concepts”’ (225) rather than merely taking over traditional tropes, authenticity would be 
something like an obligation for the philosopher. But Golob goes further: on the basis of the 
exegetical fact that Heidegger often describes existence itself as a kind of ‘philosophizing’ 
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(241), it seems that a concern for authenticity is a desideratum for all acting for the sake of 
something. Though this does not amount to an ‘obligation’ to be authentic (244), authenticity 
allows us to ‘better navigate among the irreducibly finite’ demands that confront us in das 
Man (243), because only as authentic are we ‘genuine loci of responsibility’ (248).  
Having presented his interpretation of Heidegger, Golob concludes his book with some 
contrarian reflections. First, his dismissal of the dominant approach’s emphasis on the 
phenomenological difference between ‘sensorimotor’ intentionality and reflective 
deliberation is generalized to the claim that ‘Heideggerian phenomenology places no special 
weight on conscious experience’ (254). I think this conclusion is hasty. It is true that ‘insofar 
as Heidegger’s phenomenology can be said to have a single guiding light, it is [...] 
normativity’ (254), but it seems to me that neither the prototype theory nor the account of 
finitude are intelligible apart from a phenomenology that refers at every point–if only tacitly–
to the descriptive features of first-person experience. First, Heidegger’s understanding of 
concepts (or prototypes) as ‘formal indications’–a notion that Golob mentions but does not 
develop–is predicated on the very kind of experiential ‘authenticity’ Golob himself 
emphasizes: insight into the ‘evidence situation’ in which we try to ‘coin the appropriate 
existential concepts’. Second, the sort of self-directed transcendental argument that does the 
heavy lifting in Chapter Three requires that the descriptive features of our experience be 
fixed, and there is no way to do that except through reflection on first-person experience. 
Finally, the accuracy conditions that Golob attributes to the a-variable cannot really be 
characterized without engaging in the kind of phenomenological reflections that Merleau-
Ponty (and his dominant approach followers, among others) pursue.  
Somewhat surprisingly, Golob concludes by calling into question the whole project of 
looking for an intentionality that is more primordial than propositional intentionality. Here 
the paradox of interpreting Being and Time through the later notion of prototype becomes 
acute. For Golob seems to think that the failure of the prototype theory as such is 
demonstrated by Being and Time’s failure to establish time as the prototype for all 
understanding of being. Thus he suggests that we drop the prototype theory and think of 
Heidegger’s subsequent turn to freedom and normativity not as unearthing a more primordial 
mode of intentionality but as a way of ‘unpacking the explanatory structure of propositional 
intentionality’ (255). The result would be that ‘there would be no mode of intentionality that 
was not propositional’ (256).  
 I am not convinced that this is anything more than a terminological matter. When in 
The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic Heidegger calls Dasein’s transcendence a kind of 
‘primal intentionality’, he distinguishes it clearly enough from act-intentionality, and not 
much seems to hang on whether one calls it an ‘explanatory condition’ of propositional 
intentionality rather than a mode of intentionality itself. And while Golob thinks that the 
claims about freedom and normativity he developed in Chapters Five and Six are 
‘compatible’ with the prototype theory but ‘logically separable from it’ (255), I’m not so 
sure. I agree that the prototype theory is at work in Being and Time, though it is not named 
there; but I would argue that the normative concept of freedom, also not named, is at work 
there as well. And I have already suggested that the failure of Being and Time stems not from 
the prototype theory itself but from an unmotivated commitment to the idea that there must 
be a single exemplary meaning of being. If, further, one attends to the role of the agathon in 
Heidegger’s actual development of the prototype theory–as the formally-indicating concept 
which adumbrates the context of my responsibility for going on in light of what I hold to be 
‘best’–then separating freedom from Vorbild does not seem to be an option. The claim that 
the relation between freedom and normativity is the explanatory ground of propositional 
intentionality stands or falls with conceiving of conceptual normativity as context-
adumbrating exemplarity to which I am committed in my practice and whose meaning is 
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always at issue in that practice. Whether this remains a kind of ‘conceptualism’ in Sacha 
Golob’s specific sense can remain open for now. His wonderful book will be indispensable 
for any future discussion of Heidegger and intentionality.  
Steven Crowell, Rice University  
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The aim of Sacha Golob’s recent book Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom and Normativity is 
to offer up a fundamentally new account of the arguments and concepts which define 
Heidegger’s early philosophy. For all intents and purposes the text delivers exactly that. The 
acuity with which Golob handles his presentation of Heidegger’s position, as well as the 
overall rigour, strength and originality of the claims advanced mark this book out as a timely 
and substantial contribution to the field. The approach is patient, but not laboured; detailed, 
technical and at times dense; but above all readable and highly rewarding. While its thesis 
may not entirely resonate with the diversity of approaches to Heidegger’s philosophy the 
book should, nonetheless, be of real benefit to all those with a strong interest in Heidegger’s 
thought; it will also appeal to anyone with an interest in the historical context to which such 
texts as Sein und Zeit belong. Those conversant in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind 
and philosophy of perception will similarly find much of value in the account which Golob 
presents. Here, however, I focus on only a general presentation of what I consider to be the 
book’s most important claims. 
To a large degree the arguments put forward hinge on a distinction drawn between 
propositional intentionality and conceptual content, resulting in the novel, and to some 
perhaps paradoxical claim that propositional intentionality is derivative for Heidegger on a 
‘mode of experience that is conceptual and yet nonpropositional’ (p. 3). As Chapter 3 fleshes 
out in detail, the derivative nature of propositional content is best grasped in terms of the ‘a 
as b variable’ (broadly understood along the lines of the conjunction of what the author calls 
Context, A Priori and Ontological Knowledge). Later chapters, although in part logically 
independent, explore the implications of this reading with particular regard to the role of 
normativity. 
The early discussion centres around two preliminary considerations: first, can a viable 
reading be found for Derivative, i.e., the claim that ‘propositional intentionality is 
explanatory derivative on some irreducibly nonpropositional mode of intentionality’ (p. 25); 
and second, can it be shown with sufficient philosophical and exegetical clarity that 
propositional intentionality is something which Heidegger indexes to an times multiply 
ambiguous present-at-hand ontology (glossed in the existing literature, and defined in this 
case as Present-at-hand*) (p. 19). According to the ‘dominant account’ (in its most 
sophisticated form attributed to Carman and Wrathall) propositional intentionality as 
Heidegger conceives of it is unable to capture the richer aspects of experience; this entails the 
claim that Dasein’s basic form of intentionality is instead nonpropositional and 
nonconceptual. This view is seemingly mistaken: ‘the primary level of Dasein’s intentionality 
is not nonconceptual and nonpropositional; Heidegger does not hold that propositions 
necessarily distort our basic forms of our experience’ (p. 28). In short, Golob at first seems to 
be claiming that Dasein’s basic mode of intentionality does not appeal to some nebulous, 
nonpropositional x which is supposed to be constitutive of ‘world’ as Heidegger understands 
it. This claim, however problematic it may appear to some (particularly in the context of SZ), 
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is well argued. The dominant approach is treated fairly, seriously and with balance, though 
the conclusion holds that none of the existing proposals (e.g., defining the constitutive x in 
terms of the practical) are ‘ultimately satisfactory’ (p. 40). As is suggested, we therefore 
‘need to abandon the dominant reading of Heidegger on intentionality’ (p. 46). 
What immediately follows is largely couched in terms of Present-at-hand#, a nuanced 
reinterpretation of Heidegger’s thesis. On Golob’s reading of the issue present-at-hand 
entities are not only represented by propositions but those propositions must, in turn, ‘be 
subject to a certain type of philosophical analysis’ (p. 49). He subsequently holds that this 
new reading severs the widely held link between Present-at-hand and Derivative. This, we’re 
similarly told, is an acceptance of the view that all intentionality is propositional but not of 
the view that all propositions are mere ‘assertions’ as subject to ‘logical’ analysis. Declarative 
statements of the kind found in SZ need not therefore result in distortion: this ‘is something 
done to, not by, propositional content’ (p. 54). The problem for Heidegger would then appear 
to lie not in propositions per se, but in the kind of philosophical method (a logical, theoretical 
or meta-linguistic approach, for example) to which our propositions are unsatisfactorily 
subject. Accordingly, Heidegger is ‘trying to free linguistic practice from a particular 
methodological framework’ (p. 63); to instead look at propositional intentionality through an 
analysis of Dasein and the assertions which belong to Dasein within its social context. 
Similar claims appear in McManus’s insightful Heidegger and the Measure of Truth (OUP, 
2012), but the thesis is certainly in marked opposition to the Carman-Wrathall model as 
outlined; it also rejects Dahlstrom’s paradox of thematization as well as Blattner’s problem of 
self-reference. Of course, we’re still left with a problem here. If propositional content 
(cleansed or purified in some way) can capture the constitutive x noted above how might the 
Derivative thesis be explained? Why, in other words, would we be inclined to accept the view 
that there’s also a mode of intentionality prior to and separate from that which is intended 
propositionally? 
The solution (offered in Chapter 3) is simple according to Golob: Heidegger adopts 
two modes of intentionality, based not on differing content but on different grammars, i.e., 
‘irreducibly different mechanisms for delivering that content’ (p. 68). So, the mistake as 
Heidegger sees it lies not in any reliance on propositional intentionality (commonly seen to 
entail merely some species of the present-at-hand) but stems from the way in which 
propositional intentionality has been analysed by the tradition. This claim is certainly novel. 
If correct, however, then how one wonders is this commonality (content) and distinction 
(grammar) to hold? 
The potential fix on offer is grounded in the claim that Dasein’s primary level of 
intentionality is now conceptual yet nonpropositional. Golob qualifies his stance on 
Conceptualism by claiming that conceptual content is basic but that Dasein’s primary level of 
intentionality does not contain conceptual elements only. This, in what seems like an 
Allisonian-Kantian register, therefore implies ‘two very different vehicles’ (p. 71) for 
conceptual intentionality, one of which is propositional, the other nonpropositional. The 
difference thus is not quantitative but qualitative. The difference lies in the mode of 
articulation itself directed by one or other of these two vehicles; according to Golob, 
Heidegger (albeit after much internal conflict) prioritizes the latter. 
The book similarly draws on a great deal within contemporary analytic philosophy of 
mind here. Representationalist theories of intentionality are discussed; Husserl and analytic 
neo-Husserlians are also employed. Steering clear of any representational account for the 
time being, however (SZ, it’s suggested, avoids both meditational and indirect 
representationalism, for example), the argument is made that Heidegger’s stance is best 
characterized by a certain context-creating ability; it is ‘the capacity to intend entities as 
standing in various relations’ (p. 82) which is not, it must be emphasized, a capacity to intend 
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relations between entities in terms of a capacity to endorse propositions. This, I think, is 
persuasive and well supported textually. It similarly gets to the heart of the ‘a as b structure’ 
or ‘context model’ upon which Golob’s Heidegger relies. A lot here will similarly pivot 
around Heidegger’s Kantian heritage and the transcendental arguments which Golob takes 
him to advance. These transcendental arguments are not seen to be directed at entities (‘if 
they were they would merely be ontic’: p. 89) but are rather directed at an ontological context 
and our ability to intend entities within a meaningful relation. This context (roughly the b 
variable) is not to be construed along the lines of Fregean sense or Husserlian noema, 
however. The b variable may be explanatorily basic but it is not metaphysically independent 
of the entity to which it relates. Yet this seems to make intentionality sound like something 
relational nonetheless. Golob endeavours to head this worry off (and here the hope is to 
incorporate the arguments of Zahavi and Crowell) by claiming that intentionality cannot be 
reduced to some kind of interaction between the physical and psychical, say. This, it is 
claimed (though the success seems debatable), stems in part from the fact that Heidegger 
avoids the use of basic metaphysical vocabulary in the same way as other authors. 
Golob next tackles the ‘prototype’ in terms of which b variable might make sense. ‘In 
Heideggerian terminology, what we need to explain is the nature of ontological knowledge, 
of our familiarity with something other than an entity which serves as the basis for Dasein’s 
engagement with entities’ (p. 112). Naturally enough the answer will be time: ‘time … is the 
relevant prototype for world’ (p. 112). Hence time is the conceptual, nonpropositional, non-
entity like prototype in terms of which entities are made manifest. Golob elaborates on these 
themes by way of an understandable reference to Heidegger’s ‘repetition’ of Kant 
(transformed again by way of a prototype account of intentionality in relation to time) and 
Plato (underpinned by the claim that Heidegger finds here further justification for his reliance 
on a foundational prototype). Needless to say these sections, though brief, progress with the 
same fine-grained, sophisticated and careful level of analysis indicative of the text as a whole. 
I suspect, however, that some will take issue with Golob’s account of the latter. Personally 
I’m sympathetic to the approach taken. There are indeed compelling reasons for thinking that 
Heidegger assigns to philosophy a comparable task to that of Plato. Where in the Phaedrus 
one encounters a call for the soul to recover its wings, for example, the fundamental ontology 
of SZ arguably seeks to ‘awaken’ the memory of being in order to access the originary 
(though temporal) essence – the a priori essence – which is anterior to all entities. Other 
remarks (e.g., the claim in the Introduction to Metaphysics that philosophy ‘begins in a 
fundamental event’) might support this view, but such a reading (not least given the possible 
threat of onto-theology) will not be universally embraced. 
In Chapter 4 Golob uses the arguments offered thus far as a springboard into an 
analysis of ‘what one might loosely call metaphysics’ (p. 155), whereby being, truth and 
realism are analysed in the context of the ready-to-hand. Although this chapter stands alone 
in certain respects (thereby fostering only a vague sense of unevenness to the progression) it 
is used to support the book’s overall thrust. The argument in this case revolves around the 
following: ‘Heidegger’s primary aim is to give a non-naturalistic, non-reductive account of 
the nature of Dasein’s intentionality’ (p. 161); the result of this being that Heidegger cannot 
be read (contra Searle, say) as trying to privilege the ready-to-hand over the present-at-hand 
for merely the ‘absurd’ reason that we somehow see things in terms of the former first of all. 
The priority of the ready-to-hand instead finds a more sophisticated, explanatory and 
methodological justification. Perhaps the most interesting work in this chapter revolves 
around Golob’s confrontation with Heidegger’s idealism (at least the suspicion thereof) and 
the counter claim that ‘Heidegger is a realist whose overriding concern is with the conditions 
on intentionality’ (p. 174). Much of the relevant Anglo-American literature is expertly and 
again charitably surveyed but the point of disagreement remains: in spite of Heidegger’s 
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occasional carelessness, ‘intentionality is possible only through a familiarity with, a 
disclosure of, being which serves to create a clearing’ (p. 178). The implications for truth are 
also explicitly cashed out in these terms. Where representational models were previously 
rejected, ‘minimal representationalism’ emerges as an alternative: entities conform to the 
attendant truth which transcendental, ontological knowledge entails. What this then means is 
that at least some form of synthesis and ‘thus an accuracy condition’ (p. 183) is implied. 
Again, this is carefully argued even if it doesn’t quite steer us away from the problematic 
nature of Heidegger’s claim. How, for example, might we progress to the ‘primordial unity’ 
(SZ 232; 327) wherein the entity is seemingly indistinguishable from the background context 
in terms of which its phenomenal character makes sense? Can ‘togetherness [Beisammen]’ 
(SZ 33) be characterized differently or, better yet, can it be neatly dovetailed with the account 
of Prototype given? 
To some extent Chapters 5 and 6 offer a response to this kind of worry. Here a shift 
towards freedom (in accordance with Crowell freedom is understood as ‘the capacity to 
recognize and commit oneself to norms, and to act on the basis of them’: p. 195) comes 
centre stage. In this instance ‘mineness’ as specifically linked to Kantian practical freedom is 
the key (in so far as both are located within a normative framework, that is). Certainly by the 
mid to late 1930s Heidegger credits Schelling’s own appropriation and revision of Kant with 
uncovering the necessity of freedom viz. the constitutive ground of Dasein. A confrontation 
with that assessment would have been interesting to see here but Golob nonetheless states the 
position (that freedom, contiguous with the distinctive ontology of Dasein, has an intended 
explanatorily priority) well. 
This account is further fleshed out towards the end of the book. The ‘radical and 
complex limitations’ (p. 213) to which Dasein’s freedom is subject (e.g., death) receive 
helpful treatment, as does the state of one’s denial of this normative finitude, namely 
inauthenticity. While for Golob ‘thrownness’ implies an undifferentiated position initially 
compatible with both authentic and inauthentic understanding, the latter (at least its 
possibility) is unpacked by way of a reference to the phenomena of anxiety, death and guilt. 
All three of these issues are considered in relation to finitude, normativity and Dasein and all 
three phenomena, when approached in the appropriate phenomenological manner, it’s 
suggested, contribute something worthwhile: they act as paths to lead us towards an 
understanding of ‘Dasein itself’, an understanding in which ‘no normative considerations 
have any force for us’ (p. 231). Hegel is discussed in this instance and although by name the 
account of Moralität which he offers (as a kind of private, detached normative basis) is not, 
one can sense the qualified similarities. Yet there is it would seem a kind of intrinsic value 
nonetheless, though not some special ‘set of principles’ (p. 243) to which Dasein is beholden. 
The final sections of the text thereby confront Dasein’s ‘obligation’ (for Golob ultimately a 
misleading term) to be authentic. The answer here comes in the form of Heidegger’s 
‘methodological perfectionism’ (§6.3), again a way of owning up to the mineness (analogous 
to Kant’s use of ‘I’) of Dasein’s answerability. This claim has the considerable benefit of 
embracing the temporal structure of human agency whereby propositional intentionality now 
needs to be understood in terms of being-in-the-world. 
My overview inevitably passes over many of the subtleties in Golob’s account. 
Suffice to say, I consider his book to be carefully argued and persuasive, showing above all 
how sympathetic attention to Heidegger’s philosophy can still yield exciting results. I suspect 
that in time his book will become an important reference point for the debate and themes with 
which he helpfully and meticulously engages. 
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Campbell, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 
 
In this engaging and tightly argued book, Sacha Golob defends a unique thesis about 
Heideggerian intentionality. In doing so, he situates Heidegger's early work (1919-1935) in a 
dialogue with Husserlian readings of Heidegger's philosophy as well as with contemporary 
analytic thinkers. The book takes up important philosophical questions about meaning, 
freedom, and authenticity that will be of interest to anyone inclined toward philosophy. 
The book has six chapters. The first three advance Golob's new way of thinking about 
intentionality. He concludes that the project outlined in Being and Time ultimately fails 
because Heidegger does not provide an account of temporality that is nuanced or 
differentiated enough to describe the contexts of meaning that we use to understand objects. 
The last three chapters aim to explain Heidegger's thinking after Being and Timein light of 
that failure, but then they also return to themes from that text. In these chapters, Golob takes 
up the notions of freedom and normativity, which leads him to analyze a panoply of 
important Heideggerian notions, such as truth, authenticity, anxiety, and death. 
A close reading of this book will be richly rewarded, but for the sake of simplicity, let me 
paint with a broad brush. I take Golob to be proposing three main theses. The first is that 
Heidegger's idea of intentionality is conceptualist and yet non-propositional. By 
intentionality, Golob simply means, "a property, typically attributed to mental states, whereby 
those states are directed toward or about something" (6). Against many other commentators 
on Heidegger, this book argues that the basic level of experience for Heidegger, what Golob 
calls throughout the book "the explanatorily primary level of Heideggerian intentionality," 
contains conceptual content. In making this claim, Golob is distancing himself from those 
who equate conceptual and propositional intentionality (104), which then allows him to 
advance his next thesis. He writes, "I am going to claim that the core of Heidegger's account 
of nonpropositional, conceptual intentionality rests on the idea of a prototype" (109). Thus, 
Golob's second main thesis is that - against Kant's critical framework but consistent with 
Plato's theory of forms - Heidegger's intentionality employs a basic prototype approach. 
In Being and Time, that prototype is time. These two theses are fleshed out in the first three 
chapters, which constitute, in my judgment, the heart of the book. The fourth chapter uses the 
prototype approach to explain Heidegger's theory of truth, but the next thesis emerges in 
Chapters five and six, where Golob claims that, "freedom is the capacity to commit oneself to 
norms" (195). By looking at Dasein's freedom in normative terms, that is, by saying that 
Dasein operates "within a normative terrain" (213), Golob can then recast authenticity and 
inauthenticity in those terms. As such, and this I take to be the third main thesis of the book, 
authenticity is a matter of understanding the normative terrain in which Dasein operates, in 
other words, authentic Dasein, "accurately understands its own nature: i.e. it makes sense of 
itself . . . in a way that reflects the facts about Dasein that texts such as [Being and Time] 
have supposedly identified" (214). 
As one who has now traveled along the paths beaten by this engaging and provocative book, I 
do want to provide something of a guidepost. The Introduction claims that the author will 
show that while "Dasein's primary intentionality is conceptual, it is nevertheless 
nonpropositional" (2). But then roughly the first seventy pages, encompassing Chapters one 
and two, make the case that "there is no class of content such that it cannot be captured by 
propositions" (67). Golob goes to great lengths to show that for Heidegger the explanatorily 
basic level of experience has conceptual content and can be rendered in propositions, even 
scientific propositions (64), that do not distort that experience. We find him asserting in 
Chapter one, for example, that "the primary level of Dasein's intentionality is not 
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nonconceptual and nonpropositional" (28), and we even find him defending "the view that all 
intentionality is propositional" (34). In light of his contention in the Introduction, this was 
confusing, at least until Chapter three, where we learn that Heideggerian intentionality is 
conceptual but can be nonpropositional. 
Nonetheless, Golob is raising a fascinating and important mulitfaceted question here, which I 
might synthesize in the following way: do concepts, propositions, and assertions in some way 
distort or diminish our basic way of experiencing the world? Golob writes, "One of the 
classic arguments for nonconceptual content is that certain experiences, in particular 
perception, are somehow so rich or diffuse or fine-grained that they cannot be captured in 
language" (10). This is an important expression, which surfaces numerous times throughout 
the text. Golob catalogs an array of positions by thinkers who claim that for Heidegger, 
language fails to do justice to the richness of human experience. The conceptualist reading of 
Heidegger advanced by Golob depends on how we understand what Heidegger says in Being 
and Time about present-at-hand entities and about the notion of assertion. Golob carefully 
dissects various ways of conceiving what is meant by the present-at-hand, but the gist of his 
argument is that concepts, assertions, and propositions do not necessarily cut an entity off 
from the context of meaningful relations in which it is embedded and so do not necessarily 
render the entity present-at-hand. 
To take just a few examples, he argues that assertions might preserve an entity's relationship 
to its context (20); that the conceptual is not necessarily a "detached or deliberate or explicit 
or self-conscious experience" (30); that skills or savoir faire, which Hubert Dreyfus says are 
nonpropositional, "need only be cashed as the capacity to apply one proposition rather than 
another" (34) (meaning that "the skill is not a mode of intentionality" 34n84); and that 
cognition is not simply a matter of staring at entities but is rather an "active process" that 
does not involve "a suspension of practical concerns" (38-39). But the most important ideas 
relate to what Golob, referring to Taylor Carman and Mark Wrathall, has termed the Carman-
Wrathall model, which argues that for practical, normative, and perceptual reasons, 
"propositions are unable to capture the distinctive content present at the primary level of 
experience" (40). On Golob's reading, they say this because, first, our primary comportments 
and behaviors are practically and not conceptually oriented (43-44), second, our basic, 
fundamental level of experience cannot be either true or false (44), and, third, the primary 
level of intentionality involves a kind of perceptual, sensory-motor experience that is either 
too vague or too rich to be grasped in propositions. 
Interestingly, Golob's responses to these claims chiefly take the form of questions: "what 
sense of 'practical' is in play here such that it is opposed to 'conceptual or logical'?" (43-44); 
"why . . . can't the instrumental chains beloved by Heidegger be captured in propositional 
terms?" (44); "why could this pursuit of ends and competence not be analysed in terms of, 
rather than opposed to, my possession of the relevant concepts?" (44); "why can I not simply 
assert propositions such as 'these entities stand in a normative relation other than truth'?" (45). 
In other words, in this key section of the text, Golob does not so much argue as implore his 
interlocutors to see something that seems quite clear to him. Why is it that Golob views 
things so differently than Carman, Wrathall, Dreyfus, and others? It may have something to 
do with what they are looking for. Golob says that the "Carman-Wrathall model aims to 
identify some feature x which both explains why the explanatory primary form of Dasein's 
intentionality is nonpropositional and why such intentionality cannot be captured by a 
proposition" (43). Is Heidegger looking for an explicit x? 
Consider what he says in "The Origin of the Work of Art" about color. He writes, "Color 
shines and wants only to shine. When we analyze it in rational terms by measuring its 
wavelengths, it is gone. It shows itself only when it remains undisclosed and 
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unexplained."[1] The same can be said about experience, even in the early Heidegger, where 
he was concerned about the ways that language, including discussion, distorts experience. 
Golob insists that when Heidegger says that propositions diminish our experiences, he has in 
mind "a particular philosophical approach" (53-54). That approach, he says, is when an 
assertion is "subject to 'logical' analysis" (54). But when we look back at Heidegger's early 
lecture courses, we see that he was very much concerned about the ways in which ordinary 
language, even just recounting what happened to you during the day, modifies and even 
distorts the original experience.[2] Thus the issue is not with whether certain experiences 
cannot be captured by concepts and propositions. All experiences are subject to linguistic 
articulation, but when we do so, something is lost. The original experience is modified, 
distorted or leveled down in some way. Here is an example that may resonate with anyone 
reading this review. The conceptual apparatus used in teaching evaluations may tell us 
something about what happened in a classroom, but they will never grasp the experience that 
students had taking the class. One can argue, and Golob does (64), that in using propositions 
and assertions in his own work, Heidegger (on the dominant view that Golob is criticizing) is 
engaging in the very objectification, distortion, and leveling down that he opposes, resulting 
in a paradox or contradiction. But this passes over his endless attempts at developing 
neologisms and inventive linguistic innovations, which were designed to resist the conceptual 
leveling down that he thought plagued language itself. 
In Chapter three, which is the longest and most complicated, Golob builds upon his claim that 
the primary level of Heideggerian intentionality necessarily, though not exclusively, contains 
conceptual content. The two nonconceptual elements of that intentionality are objects and 
moods. This is a remarkable chapter, providing an in-depth analysis of the basic contextual 
structure of intentionality in Being and Time, carefully explaining what it means for 
Heidegger to make the hermeneutic claim that we understand "a as b," that is, that we 
understand an entity "a" in terms of its context "b." For Heidegger, we must have some 
familiarity with that context in terms of which we understand entities. Golob argues that that 
context cannot itself be an entity, or else we would need some other context in order to 
understand it. To avoid this infinite regress, we must have some apriori familiarity with that 
context. Golob does not mention the hermeneutic circle here, which might solve the problem 
of infinite regress. Nonetheless, Golob's account here is highly innovative. He discerns in 
Heidegger a prepropositional and yet conceptual level of meaning, which he calls "a new 
depth grammar." It is a grammar because the prepropositional content may be expressed in 
propositions without any loss of meaning, as both contain identical conceptual content. This 
innovation is the prototype model. 
For Golob we are able to locate entities within a relational context, that is, we are able to 
locate the "a" variable within the "b" variable, because of "a prior familiarity with a prototype 
that exemplifies the relations that define those contexts" (109). Golob uses the example of a 
hat to introduce the way in which one's nonpropositional exposure to the hat can familiarize 
one with the different relations according to which we make sense of similar entities (109). 
He then argues that the prototype in Being and Time is time. Importantly, the prototype 
cannot be an entity, due to the infinite regress mentioned above. It must be ontological and 
thus not a being. 
In my judgment, this prototype approach has remarkable potential to explain Heidegger's 
thinking, especially his use of examples, which are often the most illuminating and 
instructive aspects of his thought. But how can time be a prototype? A prototype, such as the 
hat, is particular, an example serving as a model, and it is an entity. I do not see how a 
prototype can be general and not an entity, which is why I also do not see the links between 
the prototype model and the Platonic forms (123-135). I wish that Golob had not used the 
term "prototype" in his definition of prototype (109). In the discussion of Plato, he talks about 
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the Platonic "ideas as prototypes" (133), but, again, this does not fit with Golob's example of 
the hat. Copies of the hat must look exactly like the prototypical hat. For Plato, however, hats 
can come in many different shapes, sizes, and colors, and yet still participate in the form or 
idea of hat. Ultimately, I do not see how time or even modes of time 
like Temporalität and Zeitlichkeit can serve as prototypes because they are general. Golob 
might have gone in a different direction here, using the prototype approach to explain how 
Heidegger uses specific examples, such as the bridge that extends over the Neckar River in 
Heidelberg in "Building Dwelling Thinking," to show how phenomenological descriptions of 
specific things can familiarize us with meaningful contexts, opening up space and a world in 
which to dwell. 
Golob's understanding of what Heidegger means by Being is different from what many 
scholars of Heidegger take it to mean, and I think he knows this. The book is meant to offer a 
new, and controversial, way of thinking about Heidegger's work. So, when Golob talks about 
truth, he deviates from the more common understanding of truth in Heidegger as 
unconcealment prior to correctness and incorrectness by saying that Heidegger is a minimal 
representationalist whose notion of truth must contain "accuracy conditions" (180). Golob 
argues that for Heidegger, truth involves meaning, and thus understanding, and something 
can always be understood either correctly or incorrectly (183). As such, to understand Being 
involves the correct or incorrect understanding of the properties of a thing, which constitute 
its essence (184). For Golob, an entity cannot simply be disclosed or given. It must be 
contextualised, the "a" variable must be located within the "b" variable, and with the "a as b" 
structure an accuracy condition is operative (183). 
A Heideggerian response to this would be to say that the properties of a thing do not 
constitute its Being. Properties are beings, entities, and so are ontic on Heidegger's terms, not 
ontological. But Golob's approach to Heidegger is conceptual through and through. Even 
moods are conceptual: "their role is to articulate essentially conceptual structures" (207). 
When he talks about authenticity and freedom, he sees these as involving self-understanding 
within a normative terrain and thus within the "space of reasons" (220). Golob surely is right 
when he says that one can be authentic against the backdrop of a social world dominated by 
"the one" (217-218). But then he views anxiety as a "conceptual state" wherein one is 
disconnected or separated from a "web of interrelated tools and tasks" (227) that is still there 
but no longer has "normative force" for you (233). Authenticity then "requires a full 
understanding of Dasein, and by extension of the basic contours of the space of reasons" 
(218), and the "demand" to be authentic becomes "a necessary precondition on philosophy" 
(241). Concluding, Golob views Heidegger as saying that authenticity is important because it 
is essential for doing good philosophy. But Heidegger is not trying to say that "all activity is 
philosophy, and all value is philosophical value" (242). He was not trying to make human 
existence more philosophical, he was trying to connect philosophy to human existence. My 
worry is that Golob's understanding of Heidegger is too theoretical, too conceptualist, which 
is why he claims that authenticity in "Heidegger's perspective is profoundly theoretical" (242) 
and why he makes the practical awareness of savoir faire or know-how into a knowledge 
affair: "it is the know . . . that makes possible the how" (140, emphasis in original). 
Whether you agree with the arguments in this book or not may depend on how you 
understand concepts. My sense is that the Carman-Wrathall model thinks of a concept as "an 
explicit or thematic or systematic understanding" of something, which is how Golob says we 
should not think about the concept, mainly because if we did, then Kant's categories would 
not be concepts (9). But even Kant says that the categories are special concepts. Golob 
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appeals to Kant's notion of concept, but then in his definition, Golob employs the very 
language that he argues against. He says that the content of a concept "is not qualitatively rich 
or diffuse or fine-grained in a way that prohibits its expression in any declarative sentence" 
(10). I think this begs the question, since Golob's point is that there is no content so "rich or 
diffuse or fine-grained" that it cannot be stated in concepts. But maybe this does not matter. 
At the heart of this book is a question with a long philosophical history: do concepts (or 
assertions, or propositions), as James might say, still the stream of experience? Golob's 
engaging and thought-provoking answer makes an important contribution to a new chapter in 
the history of that question, one from which both analytic and continental thinkers will profit 
greatly. 
 
[1] Heidegger, Martin. "The Origin of the Work of Art," translated by Albert Hofstadter 
in Basic Writings, edited by David Farrell Krell (Harper Collins, 1977, 1993). 
[2] See GA 58 Basic Problems of Phenomenology: Winter Semester 1919/1920, tr. Scott M. 
Campbell (Bloomsbury, 2013), pp. 90-91. 
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Sacha Golob: Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom and Normativity, 270 S., Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2014.  
 
Sacha Golob entwickelt mit wünschenswerter Klarheit eine normativitätstheoretische 
Interpretation von Heideggers Intentionalitätsverständnis. Deren systematische Pointe besteht 
darin, dass Heidegger nicht-propositionale Intentionalität beschreibt, die dennoch immer 
auch sprachliche oder begriffliche Gehalte umfasst und deshalb in einem schwachen Sinne 
durchaus begrifflich ist. Wenn diese Theorie kohärent ist, würde Heidegger in ein bisher 
kaum erschlossenes, wenn nicht ganz neues Gebiet der Intentionalitätstheorie gehören.  
Die ersten beiden Kapitel haben das Ziel, die herrschende Deutung von Sein und Zeit (SZ) zu 
widerlegen, durch welche diese Pointe gerade ausgeschlossen wird: Folgt man der von 
Hubert Dreyfus entwickelten und gegenwärtig von Taylor Carman, Mark Wrathall und 
insbesondere Sean Kelly vertretenen Lesart, ist für Heidegger eine nicht-begriffliche Form 
von Intentionalität fundamental. Durch eine solche Auslegung seiner These, dass das 
Seinsverständnis der Vorhandenheit in der Zuhandenheit fundiert ist, wird Heidegger in 
Vorwegnahme Merleau-Pontys zum Theoretiker eines mindless coping und verkörperter 
Motorintentionalität. Nach einer vorbildlichen Klärung seiner Begriffe diskutiert Golob 
insgesamt zehn verschiedene Argumente und Varianten dieser Deutung, die er aus 
exegetischen und/ oder konzeptionellen Gründen verwirft (28 – 47).  
 Seine eigene Lesart entwickelt Golob dann ab dem dritten Kapitel durch eine 
Diskussion des „hermeneutischen Als“. Intentionalität definiert sich demnach am Modell ‚a-
als-b‘: etwas (a) wird als etwas (b) intendiert, wobei Golob dies als den Kontext näher 
bestimmt, in dem a intendiert wird. Das erlaubt es ihm, Vorhandenheit und Zuhandenheit 
schlicht als verschiedene Varianten der b-Variablen, als verschiedene „Grammatiken“ (71) zu 
rekonstruieren, wie a intentional erfasst werden kann. Entscheidend ist nun Golobs These, 
dass die b-Variable nicht propositional, aber begrifflich gefüllt werden muss: a wird im 
Hinblick auf einen Kontext intendiert, der eine logische Struktur hat und damit zum Raum 
der Gründe gehört. Die logische Struktur von b erläutert Golob, indem er Heidegger die 
Prototypen-These (109) zuschreibt, der zufolge jede intentionale Erfassung eines jeweiligen a 
eine allgemeinere Form von Intentionalität (einen Prototyp), welche die b-Variable 
repräsentiert, beinhaltet. Die Prototypen-These führt Golob deshalb dazu, Heidegger einen 
schwachen Konzeptualismus zuzuschreiben, den er durch vier Merkmale erläutert (10): 
Intentionale Zustände beinhalten immer auch ein Moment generischer Allgemeinheit (i) und 
schließen deshalb normative oder inferentielle Relationen mit ein (ii). Außerdem verfügen 
weder Tiere über begriffliche Intentionalität in diesem Sinne (iii), noch gibt es für Heidegger 
intentionale Gehalte, die zu fein wären, um nicht begrifflich erfasst werden zu können (iv). 
Paradigmatische Fälle für solche Prototypen sind die sogenannten „horizontalen Schemata“ 
der Temporalität, deren ontologisches Wissen nicht-propositional, aber eben begrifflich ist, 
weil diese Schemata Grundformen von Intentionalität umschreiben, innerhalb derer sich alle 
Intentionalität bewegen muss.  
 In exegetischer Hinsicht erlaubt es die Prototypen-These Golob nicht nur, Heideggers 
Projekt von den Frühschriften über SZ bis zu den Grundproblemen der Phänomenologie (GA 
24) mit Hilfe aktueller Begrifflichkeit aus den Debatten um den Intentionalitätsbegriff 
nachzuzeichnen. Auch die Kritik an Husserls Repräsentationalismus der Noemata ebenso wie 
seine Auseinandersetzung mit Kant und Platon kann Golob schlüssig erläutern: Immer 
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handelt es sich um Versuche, das in intentionalen Zuständen vorausgesetzte begriffliche, aber 
nicht propositionale Wissen zu erläutern. Im vierten Kapitel erläutert Golob von dieser 
Beobachtung ausgehend Heideggers Metaphysik und Wahrheitstheorie aus dem 
so entwickelten Intentionalitätsverständnis. Dabei erweist sich Heidegger als Realist in einem 
spezifischen Sinne: Gegen die These eines „temporalen Idealismus“ (William Blattner) 
wendet Golob die Überlegung, dass Heidegger ontologisches Wissen zwar als Bedingung 
dafür versteht, dass sich Menschen auf etwas (a) beziehen können. Aber Zeit ist nicht für die 
Individuation von a’s verantwortlich (177).  
 Die letzten beiden Kapitel stellen Heideggers Intentionalitätsverständnis dann in einen 
neuen, normativitätstheoretischen Zusammenhang: Golob versteht Heideggers Beschäftigung 
mit Freiheit als Alternative zum mit SZ scheiternden Versuch, Temporalität als Bedingung 
und Grundform von Intentionalität zu erläutern. Beide Formen der Beschreibung der 
Möglichkeit von Intentionalität seien logisch unabhängig. Obwohl Golob hier viel von 
anderen normativitätstheoretischen Interpretationen übernimmt, die insbesondere John 
Haugeland seit den 1980er Jahren entwickelt hat, weicht er damit in einem entscheidenden 
Punkt doch von diesen ab: Golob trennt die Freiheit, sich in der Alternative von 
Eigentlichkeit und Uneigentlichkeit zu normativen Ansprüchen Anderer (des „Man“) zu 
verhalten, von jeder Form eines primären Weltverstehens. Während etwa Steven Crowell zu 
zeigen versucht hat, dass Heidegger an einer Vorstellung des Guten als Grund und Maßstab 
von Intentionalität epekeina tes ousias festhält, so dass das Gute jene Stelle besetzt, die für 
Kant das moralische Gesetz hatte, fehlt in Golobs Rekonstruktion jede Form einer solchen 
(transzendenten) Bindung. Anstatt also die Prototypen-These normativitätstheoretisch zu 
reformulieren geht Golob lediglich davon aus, dass Eigentlichkeit als formalisierte Variante 
einer normativen Bestimmung des Menschseins zu verstehen ist. Für Heidegger sei es 
weiterhin typisch, in einer Art methodologischem Perfektionismus (240) eigentliche Existenz 
und den ‚richtigen’ Vollzug von Philosophie zu identifizieren. Dadurch folgt in Golobs 
Interpretation aus dem Scheitern von Heideggers fundamentalontologischem Projekt ein Bild 
von Normativität als Zusammenspiel sich zwar womöglich authentisch aber zuletzt immer 
beliebig selbst verpflichtender Individuen. Von der Endlichkeit des Daseins ist auch die 
Philosophie nicht ausgenommen, auch sie untersteht zuerst dem Ideal der Eigentlichkeit und 
ist erst dann der Wahrheit verpflichtet.  
Ob Golob damit der radikalen, sogar revolutionären Funktion gerecht wird, die Heidegger der 
Philosophie zuschreibt, ist jedoch zu bezweifeln. Zwar scheitert Heidegger sicherlich daran, 
Temporalität als jenen absoluten Kontext zu beschreiben, in dem sich alle Intentionalität hält, 
und es ist zumindest fraglich, ob das Gute für Heidegger tatsächlich als Bedingung 
normativer Orientierung fungiert, wie Crowell meint. Aber das Scheitern der 
fundamentalontologischen Spekulation bedeutet zumindest für Heidegger noch nicht, dass die 
Seinsfrage verschwindet oder die Frage nach dem Guten an ihre Stelle tritt. Auch 
werkgeschichtlich beschäftigt sich Heidegger zwar immer weniger mit dem Sein, dafür umso 
mehr mit dem Erscheinen der Welt als „Geviert“.  Hier wäre genauer zu untersuchen, 
inwiefern es sich nicht gerade bei diesem Begriff um eine erneute Variante der Prototypen-
These handelt—allerdings dadurch abgewandelt, dass Heidegger an die Stelle des Vorrangs 
der Zeit vier gleichursprüngliche Strukturmomente setzt.  
 Golob beschließt sein Buch mit dem Vorschlag, die Suche nach einer vor-
propositionalen Form von Intentionalität einzustellen und Heideggers Normativitätstheorie 
vielmehr als Angebot zu verstehen, die Tiefenstruktur propositionaler Intentionalität zu 
begreifen (255). Wie diese Alternative näher zu verstehen ist, führt Golob nicht weiter aus, 
macht aber darauf aufmerksam, dass sich von seiner Interpretation Linien ins Spätwerk 
ziehen lassen müssten. Das ist in der Tat eine vielversprechende Perspektive: Bedenkt man 
etwa die Rolle des „Worts“ in Unterwegs zur Sprache, dann ließe sich auch dem späten 
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Heidegger ein schwacher Konzeptualismus zuschreiben, der jedoch von der propositionalen 
Struktur von Sprache nicht zu trennen ist, ganz so wie Golob es annimmt. Im Ergebnis bringt 
Golobs Buch so nicht nur die bislang erbittert, aber ergebnislos geführten Diskussionen um 
Heideggers Beschreibung nicht-propositionaler Intentionalität wesentlich voran, sondern 
stellt zuletzt die Trennung zwischen einer nicht-propositionalen und einer abgeleiteten 
propositionalen Intentionalitätsform grundsätzlich in Frage. Damit läuft sie auf eine nur 
angedeutete hermeneutische Lesart zu, in der Heideggers Sprachphilosophie zentral werden 
müsste. Integriert man diese jedoch als Variante eines späten Konzeptualismus Heideggers in 
die von Golob rekonstruierte Normativitätstheorie, dann dürfte sich diese in einer Weise 
anreichern, wie es weder der temporalen Ontologie noch Heideggers Andeutungen zur Rolle 
des Guten gelingt.  
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